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Key points 
Banks in the northern eurozone have capital ratios that are, on average, less than half of the capital ratios 
of banks in the eurozone’s periphery. We explain this by the fact that northern eurozone banks profit 
from the financial solidity of their governments and follow business strategies aimed at issuing too 
much subsidised debt. In doing so, they weaken their balance sheets and become more fragile – less able 
to withstand future shocks. Paradoxically, financially strong governments breed fragile banks. The 
opposite occurs in countries with financially weak governments. In these countries banks are forced to 
strengthen themselves because they are unable to rely on their governments. As a result they have 
significantly more capital and reserves than banks in the northern eurozone. 
Recommendations 
More than in the south, the governments of northern Europe should stand up and force the banks to 
issue more equity. This should go much further than what is foreseen in the Basel III accord. If the 
experience of the southern eurozone countries is any guide, banks in the north of the eurozone should at 
least double the capital and the reserves as a percentage of their balance sheets. Failure to do so risks 
destroying the financial solidity of the northern European governments when, in the future, negative 
shocks force these governments to come to the rescue of their undercapitalised banks.  
The new responsibilities entrusted to the European Central Bank as the single supervisor in the 
eurozone create a unique opportunity for that institution to change the regulatory and supervisory 
culture in the eurozone – one that has allowed large banks to continue living dangerously, with 
insufficient capital. 
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ne of the more troublesome features of 
banks is that they still hold so little 
equity. In 2013 the capital and reserves 
of EU banks amounted to only 7.6% of total 
balance sheets. Well-run businesses outside the 
banking sector typically hold equity shares of 
20%, 30% or more of their balances sheets. For 
good reasons; these well-run firms know that 
shocks can occur that could wipe out large parts 
of their balance sheets. Good business strategy 
thus leads these firms to hold sufficiently large 
buffers to avoid bankruptcy. 
These principles of good behaviour do not seem 
to apply to banks, however. Admati and 
Hellwig (2013) have identified the main cause of 
the low equity shares in banks’ balance sheets. 
This is the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome. Large 
banks profit from an implicit guarantee from 
their governments that will not allow these 
institutions to fail. As a result of this guarantee, 
banks can issue debt at very favourable terms. 
This in turn gives them an incentive to issue 
cheap debt and to avoid issuing equity that does 
not profit from government guarantees. Thus, 
the fundamental reason why large banks issue 
too much debt and too little equity is that they 
profit from the subsidy implicit in government 
guarantees.  
The value of this implicit subsidy clearly 
depends on the financial strength of the 
government. A guarantee given by the Greek 
government to Greek banks is worth less than a 
guarantee given by the German government to 
German banks. As a result, the implicit subsidy 
enjoyed by Greek banks is likely to be much 
lower than the implicit subsidy enjoyed by 
German banks. One should expect, therefore, 
that Greek banks issue less debt and more 
equity than German banks.  
This theoretical prediction can be tested using 
data of equity shares of banks in the EU*. We 
present these in Figure 1. The figure shows 
capital plus reserves as a percentage of the total 
balance sheets of banks in the major eurozone 
countries (+ the UK) at the end of 2012. It is 
                                                       
* Note that the equity ratios used here and in the rest of this 
paper are not risk-adjusted. They can therefore be 
interpreted as the inverse of the leverage ratios.  
striking to find that the northern European 
countries’ banks have very low equity shares; 
typically 5% or less. By contrast, the banks in the 
countries of the periphery (Spain, Ireland, 
Greece) have equity shares exceeding 10%. The 
banks in the northern eurozone countries are 
backed up by financially strong governments; 
the banks in the latter countries have to rely on 
guarantees from financially weak governments. 
In effect, it appears that banks located in 
countries with financially solid governments use 
the strong guarantees provided by their 
governments to issue a lot of debt at the expense 
of equity. Just the opposite occurs in countries 
with financially weak governments. 
Figure 1. Capital+reserves (% balance sheets) (2012) 
 
Note: The data presented here relate to the Monetary 
Financial Institutions (MFIs) as defined by the ECB. The 
vast majority of euro area MFIs are credit institutions (i.e. 
commercial banks, savings banks, post office banks, credit 
unions, etc.), which accounted for 82.4% of such 
institutions (6,210 units) on 1 January 2012, while money 
market funds represented 16.9% (1,275 units).  
Capital + reserves includes equity capital, non-distributed 
benefits or funds, and specific and general provisions 
against loans, securities and other types of assets.  
Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse 
(http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018811). 
In order to test this hypothesis further we used 
the level of the ten-year government bond yields 
as a measure of the financial strength of 
governments. The lower the government bond 
yield, the stronger the financial position of the 
government, and vice versa.  
We now plot the shares of capital + reserves on 
the vertical axis and the ten-year bond yield (our 
measure of financial strength of the 
government) on the horizontal axis in Figure 2. 
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We find a significant positive relation. Banks in 
countries with low government bond yields 
(high financial strength) have low levels of 
equity; banks in countries with high bond yields 
(low financial strength) have high levels of 
equity. We explain about 50% of the total 
variation of the equity ratios by the government 
bond yields.  
Figure 2. Capital +reserves (% balance sheet) and 10-
year government bond yield, 2012 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse 
(http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018811). 
We have also experimented with another data 
set of the ECB, which is the “Consolidated 
Banking Data” set. In contrast to the previous 
data set, this one only relates to banks on a 
consolidated basis. The results are shown in 
Figure 3. We obtain a similar result. In fact, the 
explanatory power of the government bond 
yield is even stronger. 
Figure 3. Capital+ reserves (%balance sheet) and 10-
year government bond yield (2012) 
 
Note: Data refer to banks (not MFIs) and consolidates them. 
Source: European Central Bank, Consolidated Banking Data 
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/consolidated/ 
html/index.en.html). 
It should be noted that in countries where the 
government bond rates are high banks will 
typically have to pay high interest rates on the 
debt they issue. These high interest rates then 
reflect the risk premium investors want to have, 
given that the low value of the government 
guarantee creates a credit risk. These high 
interest rates in turn give banks incentives to 
issue less debt and more equity.  
It is interesting to compare the previous results 
with those obtained before the sovereign debt 
crisis. This was a period where the solidity of 
the various eurozone governments was 
perceived to be similar, as can be judged from 
the fact that before the crisis investors were 
willing to accumulate Greek and German 
government bonds at similar interest rates. The 
implicit guarantees the Greek and German 
government were giving to their domestic banks 
were thus perceived to be of similar value. 
Under those conditions one would expect that 
the banks in the south and in the north of the 
eurozone were issuing pretty much the same 
amount of equity. This is indeed what 
happened, as shown in Figure 4. Prior to the 
sovereign debt crisis the banks in the south and 
in the north of the eurozone had equity ratios 
(as a percentage of assets) that were not 
significantly different. We find that in 2007 
southern banks on average had an equity ratio 
of 6.9% versus 5.5% for the northern banks. In 
2012 southern banks had increased their equity 
ratios (on average) to 10.5% while northern 
banks – shielded by their robust governments - 
actually reduced theirs to 5.1%; less than half the 
equity ratios observed in the south.  
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Figure 4. Capital + reserves (%balance sheets) (2007) 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse 
(http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018811). 
In Box 1, we analyse the relationship between 
the equity ratios and the government bond 
yields econometrically. It confirms our previous 
analysis (readers who are less interested in 
econometric issues may wish to skip it). 
The previous analysis allows us to uncover a 
paradox. northern European banks today profit 
from the financial solidity of their governments 
and follow business strategies aimed at issuing 
too much subsidised debt. In doing so, they 
weaken their balance sheets and become more 
fragile – less able to withstand future shocks. 
The paradox is that financially strong 
governments breed fragile banks. The opposite 
occurs in countries with financially weak 
governments. In these countries banks are 
forced to strengthen themselves, unable to rely 
on their governments. The result is that they 
have significantly more capital and reserves 
(more than twice the amount in some northern 
countries) and have become less fragile. The 
financial fragility of governments breeds 
financially stronger banks.  
This is not to deny that banks in southern 
eurozone countries do not have problems of 
their own (see Ayadi, et al. (2012), Gros (2013), 
European Central Bank (2013)). In general, the 
size of non-performing loans is high in these 
banks and higher than in northern countries’ 
banks. This may also be a reason why these 
banks have been forced to hold higher capital 
ratios.  
The paradox that financially strong 
governments breed fragile banks is not easy to 
solve. In northern European countries the large 
but financially fragile banks hold their 
governments hostage. As a result, despite their 
strong financial resources, the governments in 
these countries are politically weak, unable to 
resist the pressure of the banks to keep equity 
low. 
Yet this is what must change. More than in the 
south, the governments of the northern 
European countries should stand up and force 
the banks to issue more equity. This should go 
much further than what is foreseen in the Basel 
III accord. If the experience of the southern 
eurozone countries is any guide, banks in the 
north of the eurozone should at least double the 
capital and the reserves as a percentage of their 
balance sheets. Failure to do so risks destroying 
the financial solidity of the northern European 
governments when, in the future, negative 
shocks force these governments to come to the 
rescue of their undercapitalised banks.  
The new responsibilities entrusted to the 
European Central Bank as the single supervisor 
in the eurozone creates a window of 
opportunity for that institution to change the 
regulatory and supervisory culture in the 
eurozone that has allowed the large banks to 
continue to live dangerously with insufficient 
capital. 
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Box 1. An econometric analysis of capital ratios in the EU 
In this box we test the hypothesis that government bond yields (as measures of the financial strength of 
governments) affect the equity ratios of banks. In order to do so, we use a simple fixed effects econometric 
model relating the capital ratio and government bond yields. In addition, we control for the business cycle as 
the equity ratio may be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. We specify the model as follows: 
                                            
where     is the capital (including reserves) to assets ratio of the financial institutions in country i at period t; 
        is the 10-year government bond interest rate of country i at period t;          is the real growth rate of 
country i at period t;    is the time-invariant fixed effect of country i; It reflects unobserved country specific 
variables such as government regulations, sector norms and institutional features that influence the capital 
ratio.     is the error term.  
Table 1. Regressions of capital ratio (%) in eurozone countries 
 
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Data Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
Table 1 reports the results of the regressions of capital ratio using a sample of 12 eurozone countries over the 
period 1999-2012. (We have also experimented with regressions in which we control for different features of 
the banking systems, such as the degree of concentration, size, external position, etc. The effect of the long-
term interest rate remains robust. The interested reader can obtain these results on request). 
In column (1), we find there is a significant positive relationship between the capital ratio and the 
government bond yield. We also find that the real growth rate is negatively associated with the capital ratio. 
The coefficient is only marginally significant. The negative sign suggests that equity ratios change pro-
cyclically, i.e. during booms when the risk of the banks’ assets declines, the Basel regulatory framework gives 
incentives to banks to issue less equity. During recessions, the opposite occurs, i.e. the increasing risk of 
banks’ lending portfolio forces them to have more equity. See Brunnermeier, et al. (2009). 
Column (2) shows a regression where we have added a crisis dummy. The addition of a ‘crisis dummy’, does 
not affect the relationship between the capital ratio and the government bond yield.  
Finally, we also plot the fixed effects of each eurozone country in the following figure. We observe that in a 
number of northern eurozone countries, there seem to be national idiosyncratic and time-invariant features 
(e.g. specific regulatory and supervisory features) that lead banks to have low equity ratios. 
 
De  pe  n  d  e  n  t    Variab  le  : C  ap  ital    r  atio     
    (1)    (  2  )   
10‐y  ear      go  ver  n  me  n  t b  o  n  d      y  ield      (  % )      0.17**  *     
(0.05  )     
0.1  7  *  **   
(  0  .0  5  )     
Re  al    gr  o  w th      r  ate      (  %)    ‐0.04  *     
(0.02  )     
‐0  .02     
(  0  .0  4  )     
Cr  isis    ‐‐‐‐    0.2  7     
(  0  .6  1  )     
Co  ntro  lle  d    fo  r      fixe  d    effe  c  ts    Ye  s    Yes   
Ob  s  e  rvatio  n  s    154    154   
R    s  q  uar  e      0.653    0.6  5  6     
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Fixed effects of eurozone countries (constant influence on capital ratio, %) 
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